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Abstract
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a prominent distributed learning paradigm.
FL entails some pressing needs for developing novel parameter estimation ap-
proaches with theoretical guarantees of convergence, which are also communication
efficient, differentially private and Byzantine resilient in the heterogeneous data
distribution settings. Quantization-based SGD solvers have been widely adopted in
FL and the recently proposed SIGNSGD with majority vote shows a promising direc-
tion. However, no existing methods enjoy all the aforementioned properties. In this
paper, we propose an intuitively-simple yet theoretically-sound method based on
SIGNSGD to bridge the gap. We present Stochastic-Sign SGD which utilizes novel
stochastic-sign based gradient compressors enabling the aforementioned properties
in a unified framework. We also present an error-feedback variant of the proposed
Stochastic-Sign SGD which further improves the learning performance in FL. We
test the proposed method with extensive experiments using deep neural networks
on the MNIST dataset. The experimental results corroborate the effectiveness of
the proposed method.
1 Introduction
Recently, Federated Learning (FL) has become a prominent distributed learning paradigm since it
allows training on a large amount of decentralized data residing on devices like mobile phones [1].
However, FL imposes several critical challenges. First of all, the communication capability of the
mobile devices can be a significant bottleneck. Furthermore, the training data on a given worker is
typically based on its usage of the mobile devices, which results in heterogeneous data distribution. In
addition, the local data usually contains some sensitive information of a particular mobile device user.
Therefore, there is an pressing need to develop a privacy-preserving distributed learning algorithm.
Finally, similar to many distributed learning methods, FL may suffer from malicious participants.
As is shown in [2], even a single Byzantine worker, which may transmit arbitrary information, can
severely disrupt the convergence of distributed gradient descent algorithms. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no existing methods can cope with all the aforementioned challenges. To alleviate
the communication burden of the workers, there have been various gradient quantization methods
[3–7] in the literature, among which the recently proposed SIGNSGD with majority vote [8] is of
particular interest due to its robustness and communication efficiency.1 In SIGNSGD, during each
communication round, only the signs of the gradients and aggregation results are exchanged between
the workers and the server, which leads to around 32× less communication than full-precision
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1Note that all the algorithms considered in this work use the idea of majority vote. Therefore, we ignore the
term “with majority vote” in the following discussions for the ease of presentation.
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distributed SGD. Nonetheless, it has been shown in [9] that SIGNSGD fails to converge when the data
on different workers are heterogeneous (i.e., drawn from different distributions), which is one of the
most important features in FL.
In this work, inspired by the idea of adding carefully designed noise before taking the sign operation
in [9], we present Stochastic-Sign SGD, which is a class of stochastic-sign based SGD algorithms.
In particular, we first propose a stochastic compressor sto-sign, which extends SIGNSGD to its
stochastic version Sto-SIGNSGD. In this scheme, instead of directly transmitting the signs of gradients,
the workers adopt a two-level stochastic quantization and transmit the signs of the quantized results.
We note that different from the existing 1-bit stochastic quantization schemes (e.g., QSGD [3], cpSGD
[7]), the proposed algorithm also uses the majority vote rule in gradient aggregation, which allows
the server-to-worker communication to be 1-bit compressed and ensures robustness as well. Then,
to further resolve the privacy concerns, a differentially private stochastic compressor dp-sign is
proposed, which can accommodate the requirement of (, δ)-local differential privacy [10]. The
corresponding algorithm is termed as DP-SIGNSGD. We then prove that when the number of workers is
large enough, both of the proposed algorithms converge with a rate of O(
√
d√
T
) under heterogeneous
data distribution, where d is the dimension of the hypothesis vector and T is the total number of
training iterations. In addition, assuming that there are M normal (benign) workers, it is shown
that the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is upper bounded by |∑Mm=1(g(t)m )i|/bi,∀i,
where (g(t)m )i is the i-th entry of worker m’s gradient at iteration t and bi ≥ maxm(g(t)m )i is some
design parameter. Particularly, bi depends on the data heterogeneity (through maxm(g
(t)
m )i). As
a special case, the proposed algorithms can tolerate M − 1 Byzantine workers when the normal
workers can access the same dataset (i.e., (g(t)m )i = (g
(t)
j )i,∀1 ≤ j,m ≤ M ), which recovers the
result of SIGNSGD.
We also extend the proposed algorithm to its error-feedback variant, termed as Error-Feedback
Stochastic-Sign SGD. In this scheme, the server keeps track of the error induced by the majority vote
operation and compensates for the error in the next communication round. Both the convergence and
the Byzantine resilience are established. Extensive simulations are performed to demonstrate the
effectiveness of all the proposed algorithms.
2 Related Works
Gradient Quantization: To accommodate the need of communication efficiency in distributed
learning, various gradient compression methods have been proposed. Most of the existing works
focus on unbiased methods [11, 12]. QSGD [3], TernGrad [4] and ATOMO [13] propose to use
stochastic quantization schemes, based on which a differentially private variant is proposed in [7].
Due to the unbiased nature of such quantization methods, the convergence of the corresponding
algorithms can be established.
The idea of sharing the signs of gradients in SGD can be traced back to 1-bit SGD [14]. [15] and [5,8]
show theoretical and empirical evidence that sign based gradient schemes can converge well despite
the biased approximation nature in the homogeneous data distribution scenario. In the heterogeneous
data distribution case, [9] shows that the convergence of SIGNSGD is not guaranteed and proposes to
add carefully designed noise to ensure a convergence rate of O(d
3
4 /T
1
4 ). However, their analysis
assumes second order differentiability of the noise probability density function and cannot be applied
to some commonly used noise distributions (e.g., uniform and Laplace distributions). In addition,
their analysis requires that the variance of the noise goes to infinity as the number of iterations grows,
which may be unrealistic in practice.
Error-Compensated SGD: Instead of directly using the biased approximation of the gradients,
[14] corrects the quantization error by adding error feedback in subsequent updates and observes
almost no accuracy loss empirically. [6] proposes the error-compensated quantized SGD in quadratic
optimization and proves its convergence for unbiased stochastic quantization. [16] proves the
convergence of the proposed error compensated algorithm for strongly-convex loss functions and
[17] proves the convergence of sparsified gradient methods with error compensation for both convex
and non-convex loss functions. In addition, [18] proposes EF-SIGNSGD, which combines the error
compensation methods and SIGNSGD; however, only the single worker scenario is considered. [19]
further extends it to the multi-worker scenario and the convergence is established. However, it is
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required in these two works that the compressing error cannot be larger than the magnitude of the
original vector, which is not the case for some biased compressors like SIGNSGD. [20] considers more
general compressors and proves the convergence under the assumption that the compressors have
bounded magnitude of error. However, to the best our knowledge, none of the existing works consider
the Byzantine resilience of the error-compensated methods.
Byzantine Tolerant SGD in Heterogenous Environment: There have been significant research
interests in developing SGD based Byzantine tolerant algorithms, most of which consider homoge-
neous data distribution, e.g., Krum [21], ByzantineSGD [22], and the median based algorithms [23].
[8] shows that SIGNSGD can tolerate up to half “blind” Byzantine workers who determine how to
manipulate their gradients before observing the gradients.
To accommodate the need for robust FL, some Byzantine tolerant algorithms that can deal with
heterogeneous data distribution have been developed. [24] proposes to incorporate a regularized
term with the objective function. However, it requires strong convexity and can only converge to the
neighborhood of the optimal solution. [25] uses trimmed mean to aggregate the shared parameters.
Nonetheless, it can only tolerate a small (unknown) number of Byzantine workers. In addition, both
[24] and [25] assume model aggregation, i.e., both the workers and the parameter server share their
models with others in full precision, which may incur significant communication cost.
Our Contributions. This paper makes three main contributions to the field of FL as follows.
1. We propose the framework of Stochastic-Sign SGD, which utilizes the stochastic-sign based
gradient compressors to overcome the convergence issue of SIGNSGD in the presence of het-
erogeneous data distribution. In particular, two novel stochastic compressors, sto-sign and
dp-sign, are proposed, which extend SIGNSGD to Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD, respectively.
DP-SIGNSGD is shown to improve the privacy and the accuracy simultaneously, without
sacrificing any communication efficiency. We further improve the learning performance of
the proposed algorithm by incorporating the error-feedback method.
2. We prove that all the algorithms converge with a rate of O(
√
d√
T
) in the heterogeneous
data distribution scenario, which matches SIGNSGD in the homogeneous data distribution
scenario.
3. We theoretically show the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms, which depends
on the heterogeneity of the local datasets of the workers.
3 Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider a typical federated optimization problem with M normal workers as in [1].
Formally, the goal is to minimize the finite-sum objective of the form
min
w∈Rd
F (w) where F (w) def=
1
M
M∑
m=1
fm(w). (1)
For a machine learning problem, we have a sample space I = X × Y , where X is a space of feature
vectors and Y is a label space. Given the hypothesis space W ⊆ Rd, we define a loss function
l : W × I → R which measures the loss of prediction on the data point (x, y) ∈ I made with the
hypothesis vector w ∈ W . In such a case, fm(w) is a local function defined by the local dataset of
worker m and the hypothesis w. More specifically,
fm(w) =
1
|Dm|
∑
(xn,yn)∈Dm
l(w; (xn, yn)), (2)
where |Dm| is the size of worker m’s local dataset Dm.
In many FL applications, the local datasets of the workers are heterogeneously distributed. In this
case, we have Dm 6= Dj and therefore∇fm(w) 6= ∇fj(w),∀m 6= j.
We consider a parameter server paradigm. At each communication round t, each worker m forms a
batch of training samples, based on which it computes and transmits the stochastic gradient g(t)m as an
estimate to the true gradient ∇fm(w(t)m ). When the worker m evaluates the gradient over its whole
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local dataset, we have g(t)m = ∇fm(w(t)m ). After receiving the gradients from the workers, the server
performs aggregation and sends the aggregated gradient back to the workers. Finally, the workers
update their local model weights using the aggregated gradient. In this sense, the classic stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) algorithm [26] performs iterations of the form
w(t+1)m = w
(t)
m −
η
M
M∑
m=1
g(t)m . (3)
In this case, since all the workers adopt the same update rule using the aggregated gradient, w(t)m ’s
are the same for all the workers. Therefore, in the following discussions, we omit the worker index
m for the ease of presentation. To accommodate the requirement of communication efficiency in
FL, we adopt the popular idea of gradient quantization and assume that each worker m quantizes the
gradient with a stochastic 1-bit compressor q(·) and sends q(g(t)m ) instead of its actual local gradient
g
(t)
m . Combined with the idea of majority vote in [5], the corresponding algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Stochastic-Sign SGD with majority vote
Input: learning rate η, current hypothesis vector w(t), M workers each with an independent
gradient g(t)m , the 1-bit compressor q(·).
on server:
pull q(g(t)m ) from worker m.
push g˜(t) = sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 q(g
(t)
m )
)
to all the workers.
on each worker:
update w(t+1) = w(t) − ηg˜(t).
Intuitively, the performance of Algorithm 1 is limited by the probability of wrong aggregation, which
is given by
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(w(t))
)
. (4)
In SIGNSGD, q(g(t)m ) = sign(g
(t)
m ) and (4) holds when ∇fm(w(t)) 6= ∇fj(w(t)),∀m 6= j with a
high probability, which prevents its convergence. In this work, we propose two compressors sto-sign
and dp-sign, which guarantee that (4) holds with a probability that is strictly smaller than 0.5 and
therefore the convergence of Algorithm 1 follows. Moreover, dp-sign is differentially private, i.e.,
given the quantized gradient q(g(t)m ), the adversary cannot distinguish the local dataset of worker m
from its neighboring datasets that differ in only one data point with a high probability. The detailed
definition of differential privacy can be found in Section 1 of the supplementary document.
In addition to the M normal workers, it is assumed that there exist B Byzantine attackers, and its set
is denoted as B. Instead of using sto-sign and dp-sign, the Byzantine attackers can use an arbitrary
compressor denoted by byzantine-sign. In this work, we consider the scenario that the Byzantine
attackers have access to the average gradients of all theM normal workers (i.e., g(t)j =
1
M
∑M
m=1 g
(t)
m ,
∀j ∈ B) and follow the same procedure as the normal workers. Therefore, we assume that the
Byzantine attacker j shares the opposite signs of the true gradients, i.e., byzantine-sign(g(t)j ) =
−sign(g(t)j ).
In order to facilitate the convergence analysis, the following commonly adopted assumptions are
made.
Assumption 1. (Lower bound). For all w and some constant F ∗, we have objective value F (w) ≥
F ∗.
Assumption 2. (Smoothness). ∀w1, w2, we require for some non-negative constant L
F (w1) ≤ F (w2)+ < ∇F (w2), w1 − w2 > +L
2
||w1 − w2||22, (5)
where < ·, · > is the standard inner product.
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Assumption 3. (Variance bound). For any worker m, the stochastic gradient oracle gives an
independent unbiased estimate gm that has coordinate bounded variance:
E[gm] = ∇fm(w),E[((gm)i −∇fm(w)i)2] ≤ σ2i , (6)
for a vector of non-negative constants σ¯ = [σ1, · · · , σd]; (gm)i and∇fm(w)i are the i-th coordinate
of the stochastic and the true gradient, respectively.
Assumption 4. The total number of workers is odd.
We note that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are standard for non-convex optimization and Assumption 4 is
just to ensure that there is always a winner in the majority vote [9], which can be easily relaxed.
Experimental Settings. To facilitate empirical discussions on our proposed algorithms in the remain-
ing sections, we first introduce our experimental settings here. We implement our proposed method
with a two-layer fully connected neural network on the standard MNIST dataset [27]. We consider a
scenario of M = 31 normal workers. To simulate the heterogeneous data distribution scenario, each
worker only stores exclusive data for one out of the ten categories, unless otherwise noted. We use a
constant learning rate and tune the parameter from the set {1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}. We
compare the proposed algorithms with two baselines: SIGNSGD [5] and FedAvg [28]. More details
about the implementation can be found in Section 5 of the supplementary document.
4 Algorithms and Convergence Analysis
In this section, we propose two compressors sto-sign and dp-sign for the Stochastic-Sign SGD
framework, which can deal with the heterogeneous data distribution scenario. The basic ideas of the
two compressors are given as follows.
• sto-sign: instead of directly sharing the signs of the gradients, sto-sign first performs a
two-level stochastic quantization and then transmits the signs of the quantized results.
• dp-sign: it is a differentially private version of sto-sign. The probability of each coordinate
of the gradients mapping to {−1, 1} is designed to accommodate the local differential
privacy requirements.
In this section, we first consider the scenario in which all the workers are benign. The Byzan-
tine resilience of sto-sign and dp-sign will be discussed in Section 5. In addition, we as-
sume that each worker evaluates the gradients over its whole local dataset for simplicity (i.e.,
g
(t)
m = ∇fm(w(t)),∀1 ≤ m ≤M ). Particularly, in federated learning, the workers usually compute
∇fm(w(t)) due to the small size of the local dataset. The discussion about stochastic gradients
is presented in Section 6. The proofs of the theoretical results are provided in Section 2 of the
supplementary document.
4.1 The Stochastic Compressor sto-sign
Formally, the compressor sto-sign is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For any given gradient g(t)m , the compressor sto-sign outputs sto-sign(g(t)m , b), where
b is a vector of design parameters. The i-th entry of sto-sign(g(t)m , b) is given by
sto-sign(g(t)m , b)i =
 1, with probability
bi+(g
(t)
m )i
2bi
,
−1,with probability bi−(g(t)m )i2bi ,
(7)
where (g(t)m )i and bi ≥ maxm|(g(t)m )i| are the i-th entry of g(t)m and b, respectively.
Recall that the performance of Algorithm 1 largely depends on the probability of wrong aggregation
(c.f. (4)). When q(g(t)m ) = sign(g
(t)
m ), whether (4) holds or not is determined by the gradients
g
(t)
m ’s, which are unknown. As a result, the convergence of SIGNSGD is not guaranteed. The key idea
of sto-sign is to introduce the stochasticity such that the probability of wrong aggregation can be
theoretically bounded for an arbitrary realization of g(t)m ’s.
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In the following discussion, we term Algorithm 1 with q(g(t)m ) = sto-sign(g
(t)
m , b) as Sto-SIGNSGD.
For the ease of presentation, we consider the scalar case and obtain the following results for the
compressor sto-sign. They can be readily generalized to the vector case by applying the results
independently on each coordinate.
Theorem 1. Let u1, u2, · · · , uM beM known and fixed real numbers and consider random variables
uˆm = sto-sign(um, b), 1 ≤ m ≤M . Then we have
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆm
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
um
))
<
[(
1− x)ex]M2 , (8)
where x = |
∑M
m=1 um|
bM .
Here we provide some intuition about the proof. Given the majority vote rule, the aggregation result
is wrong if more than half of the workers share the wrong signs. In addition, based on (7), we can
obtain the probability of each worker sharing 1 or -1. Therefore, the number of workers that share
the wrong signs can be modeled as a Poisson binomial variable, denoted as Z. The key difficulty is
that the correct sign sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 um) is unknown. However, thanks to the special structure of
(7), the mean of the number of workers sharing either -1 or 1 depends on 1M
∑M
m=1 um rather than
on each individual um. That being said, we can always obtain the expectation of Z as a function of
1
M
∑M
m=1 um. As a result, we can invoke the Markov inequality and obtain (8) after some algebra.
Remark 1. (selection of b) Some discussions on the choice of the vector b in (7) are in order. We take
the i-th entry of b as an example. In the FL application, the i-th entry of the gradient g(t)m corresponds
to um in Theorem 1. On the one hand, according to the definition of sto-sign, bi ≥ maxm|(g(t)m )i|.
On the other hand, it can be shown that
(
1− x)ex in (8) is a decreasing function of x (and therefore
an increasing function of bi) when x < 1. Therefore, to minimize the probability of wrong aggregation,
it is optimal to select bi = maxm|(g(t)m )i|. In addition, since the true gradients change during the
training process, the optimal bi varies across the iterations too. In the implementation of sto-sign,
for a fixed vector b, it is possible that bi < maxm|(g(t)m )i| for some coordinates. In such cases, the
probabilities defined in (7) may fall out of the range [0, 1]. We round them to 1 if they are positive and
0 otherwise. However, in practice, since maxm|(g(t)m )i| is unknown, the selection of an appropriate
b is an interesting problem deserving further investigation.
Theorem 2. Given the same {um}Mm=1 and {uˆm}Mm=1 as those in Theorem 1, for a sufficiently large
b, we have P
(
sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 uˆm
) 6= sign( 1M ∑Mm=1 um)) < 12 .
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1√
Td
. Then
for any M , by running Sto-SIGNSGD for T iterations, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
c||∇F (w(t))||1 ≤ (F (w
(0))− F ∗)√d√
T
+
L
√
d
2
√
T
+ 2bd∆(M), (9)
where c is some positive constant, and ∆(M) is the solution to
[(
1− x)ex]M2 = 12 .
Given the results in Theorem 1, the proof of Theorem 3 follows the well known strategy of relating
the norm of the gradient to the expected improvement of the global objective in a single iteration.
Then accumulating the improvement over the iterations yields the convergence rate of the algorithm.
Remark 2. Similar to SIGNSGD, the convergence rate of Sto-SIGNSGD depends on the L1-norm of
the gradient. A detailed discussion on this feature can be found in [5]. Note that compared to the
convergence rate of SIGNSGD, there is a positive coefficient c < 1. This can be understood as the cost
of dealing with the heterogeneous data distribution.
Remark 3. It can be verified that ∆(M) is a decreasing function of M and limM→∞∆(M) = 0.
In addition, if we select b ∝ 1√
dT
, the right hand side of (9) is upper bounded by O(
√
d√
T
). Moreover,
Theorem 3 holds for any b and the last term in (9) captures the gap induced by the scenarios where
the probability of wrong aggregation is larger than 12 . According to Theorem 2, the probability of
wrong aggregation is always smaller than 12 when b is sufficiently large and therefore, the last term in
(9) can be eliminated in such a case. However, setting a larger b increases the probability of wrong
aggregation and decreases the positive constant c, which negatively impact the convergence.
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Figure 1: The left figure compares the training accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD with SIGNSGD and FedAvg
[28]. The right figure shows the training and the testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD for different b = b ·1.
The results are averaged over 5 repeats. For FedAvg, we tune the number of local epochs from the set
{1, 10, 20, 30} and present the best results.
Experimental results. We perform experiments to examine the learning performance of Sto-SIGNSGD
for different selection of b. Throughout our experiments, in the fixed b scenarios, we set b = b · 1 for
some positive constant b. For “Optimal b”, we set bi = maxm|(g(t)m )i|,∀i. The results are shown in
Figure 1. It can be observed that Sto-SIGNSGD outperforms SIGNSGD and FedAvg, and the performance
of “b = 0.01” is almost the same as “Optimal b”. That beind said, compared to FedAvg, Sto-SIGNSGD
achieves better performance while requires less communication overhead per communication round.
In addition, it can be observed that for fixed b, b should be large enough to optimize the performance.
Then when b keeps increasing, both the training accuracy and the testing accuracy decrease, which
corroborates our analysis above.
4.2 The Differentially Private Compressor dp-sign
In this subsection, we present the differentially private version of sto-sign. Formally, the compressor
dp-sign is defined as follows.
Definition 2. For any given gradient g(t)m , the compressor dp-sign outputs dp-sign(g(t)m , , δ). The
i-th entry of dp-sign(g(t)m , , δ) is given by
dp-sign(g(t)m , , δ)i =
1, with probability Φ
( (g(t)m )i
σ
)
−1, with probability 1− Φ( (g(t)m )iσ ) (10)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the normalized Gaussian distribution; σ =
∆2

√
2 ln( 1.25δ ), where  and δ are the differential privacy parameters and ∆2 is the sensitivity
measure.2
Theorem 4. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , δ) is (, δ)-differentially private for any , δ ∈
(0, 1).
Remark 4. Note that throughout this paper, we assume δ > 0. For the δ = 0 scenario, the Laplace
mechanism [10] can be used by replacing the cumulative distribution function of the normalized
Gaussian distribution in (10) with that of the Laplace distribution. The corresponding discussion is
provided in the supplementary document.
We term Algorithm 1 with q(g(t)m ) = dp-sign(g
(t)
m , , δ) as DP-SIGNSGD. Similar to sto-sign, we
consider the scalar case and obtain the following result for dp-sign(·, , δ).
2Please refer to Section 1 of the supplementary document for detailed information about the differential
privacy parameters (,δ) and the sensitivity measure∆2.
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Theorem 5. Let u1, u2, · · · , uM be M known and fixed real numbers. Further define random
variables uˆi = dp-sign(ui, , δ),∀1 ≤ i ≤M . Then there always exist a constant σ0 such that when
σ ≥ σ0, P (sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 uˆi) 6= sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 ui)) <
[(
1− x)ex]M2 , where x = |∑Mm=1 um|σM .
Given Theorem 5, the convergence of DP-SIGNSGD can be obtained by following a similar analysis to
that of Theorem 3.
5 Byzantine Resilience
In this section, the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is investigated. We note that
the convergence of Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD is limited by the probability of wrong aggregation
(i.e., more than half of the workers share the wrong signs). Let Zi denote the number of normal
workers that share (quantized) gradients with different signs from the true gradient ∇F (w(t)) on
the i-th coordinate (i.e., q(g(t)m )i 6= sign(∇F (w(t))i)). Then, Zi is a Poisson binomial variable.
In order to tolerate ki Byzantine workers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient, we need to have
P (Zi ≥ M−ki2 ) < 12 , where M is the number of benign workers. Therefore, we can prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 6. There exists a positive constant s0 such that when s > s0, Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD
can at least tolerate ki Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient at t-th iteration and
ki satisfies
ki <
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
s
,
[(
1− x)ex]M−ki2 < 1
2
, (11)
where x = |
∑M
m=1∇fm(w(t))i|−ski
(M−ki)s , s = σ for DP-SIGNSGD and s = bi ≥ maxm|(g
(t)
m )i| for Sto-
SIGNSGD.
Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that the algorithms can tolerate is given by min1≤i≤dki.
In this case,
[(
1 − x)ex]M−ki2 measures the probability of wrong aggregation after taking the
Byzantine workers into consideration. As we know,
(
1 − x)ex is decreasing function of x (and
therefore an increasing function of s). So the second equation of (11) indicates that the Byzantine
tolerance decreases as s increases, which conforms to the observation from the first equation of (11).
According to (11), when sto-sign is used, we can set bi = maxm|∇fm(w(t))i|. In this case, ki <
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
maxm|∇fm(w(t))i| , which means that the Byzantine resilience depends on the heterogeneity of the
local datasets. When the workers can access the same dataset, i.e.,∇fm(w(t))i = ∇fn(w(t))i,∀m,n,
Theorem 6 gives x = 1 and ki < M . Therefore, it can tolerate M − 1 Byzantine workers.
Remark 5. Our analysis of the convergence and the Byzantine resilience is based on each individual
coordinate of the gradients, which corresponds to the generalized Byzantine attacks and the dimen-
sional Byzantine resilience [29]. Furthermore, it also indicates that the parameter σ in dp-sign can
be different across coordinates and iterations, which allows one to select suitable parameters for
different coordinates and iterations to improve the privacy performance of the algorithm. A similar
idea has been explored in [30] without considering quantization.
Experimental results. Fig. 2 shows the performance of Sto-SIGNSGD for different selection of
b = b · 1 and different number of Byzantine workers B. It can be seen that when b = 0.001, it is not
large enough to optimize the performance according to our results in Section 4. Setting b = 0.003
and b = 0.01 achieves almost the same performance as “Optimal b” when there is no Byzantine
worker (B = 0). However, as the number of Byzantine workers increases, both the training and the
testing accuracy of “b = 0.01” drop much faster than those of “b = 0.003”, which conforms to our
analysis above that a lager b results in worse Byzantine resilience.
To examine the impact of data heterogeneity, we vary the number of labels of each worker’s local
training dataset. Table 1 shows the testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD with optimal b. It can be observed
that the Byzantine resilience of Sto-SIGNSGD increases as the number of labels increases. Up to now,
we examine the performance of Sto-SIGNSGD, the results for DP-SIGNSGD are deferred to Section 7.
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Figure 2: The training and the testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD for different number of Byzantine
workers and different b.
Table 1: Testing Accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD
B 1 LABEL 2 LABELS 4 LABELS
0 90.78% 91.03% 92.38%
1 91.98% 90.78% 92.66%
2 75.58% 90.77% 93.30%
3 64.61% 77.88% 93.22%
4 11.62% 53.99% 88.22%
6 Extending to SGD
Up until this point in the paper, the discussions are based on the assumption that each worker can
evaluate its local true gradient∇fm(w(t)) for the ease of presentation. In the SGD scenario, we have
to further account for the sampling noise. Particularly, the following theorem for Sto-SIGNSGD can be
proved. The corresponding result for DP-SIGNSGD can be obtained following a similar strategy.
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1√
Td
. Then, when
b = b · 1 and b is sufficiently large, Sto-SIGNSGD converges to the (local) optimum with a rate of
O( 1√
T
) if either of the following two conditions is satisfied.
• P (sign( 1M ∑Mm=1(gtm)i) 6= sign(∇F (wt)i) < 0.5,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d.
• The mini-batch size of stochastic gradient at each iteration is at least T .
Remark 6. Note that the first condition is not hard to satisfy. One sufficient condition is that the
sampling noise of each worker is symmetric with zero mean. This assumption is also used in [8],
which shows that the sampling noise is approximately not only symmetric, but also unimodal.
Remark 7. We note that by replacing the compressor sign in SIGNSGD with sto-sign or dp-sign,
we can obtain the improved rate (a factor of 1√
M
in the variance term) without assuming unimodal
and symmetric stochastic gradient sampling noise as in [5]. More details can be found in Section 2
of the supplementary document.
Remark 8. We note that the above discussion assumes that b is sufficiently large, which guarantees
that the probability of wrong aggregation is less than 0.5. For an arbitrary b that satisfies the
condition in the definition of sto-sign, we believe that it is possible to prove that the algorithm
converges to the neighborhood of the (local) optimum. In particular, similar to the proof of Theorem
3, there will be an additional term
∑d
i=1 |∇F (wt)i|1| 1M ∑Mm=1(gtm)i|≤b∆(M). It is possible to upper
bound this additional term given the fact that E[ 1M
∑M
m=1(g
t
m)i] = ∇F (wt)i, despite that more
efforts are required to make the analysis rigorous.
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Figure 3: The first figure shows the performance of DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD for different 
when δ = 10−5, without Byzantine attackers. The ’s measure the per epoch privacy guarantee of the
algorithms. The second figure compares EF-DP-SIGNSGD with DP-SIGNSGD when  = 1. The last figure
compares Sto-SIGNSGD with EF-Sto-SIGNSGD in the presence of 1 Byzantine attacker.
7 Extending to Error-feedback Variant
To further improved the performance of Algorithm 1, we incorporate the error-feedback technique
and propose its error-feedback variant, which is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Error-Feedback Stochastic-Sign SGD with majority vote
Input: learning rate η, current hypothesis vectorw(t), current residual error vector e˜(t),M workers
each with an independent gradient g(t)m = ∇fm(w(t)), the 1-bit compressor q(·).
on server:
pull q(g(t)m ) from worker m.
push g˜(t) = sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 q(g
(t)
m ) + e˜
(t)
)
to all the workers,
update residual error:
e˜(t+1) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m ) + e˜
(t) − 1
M
g˜(t). (12)
on each worker:
update w(t+1) = w(t) − ηg˜(t).
Remark 9. Note that in Algorithm 2, only the server adopts the error-feedback method. When
dp-sign is used, implementing error-feedback on the worker’s side may increase the privacy leakage.
Accounting for the additional privacy leakage caused by error-feedback is left as future work.
Remark 10. In (12), by adding the coefficient 1M to g˜
(t), the server keeps the magnitude informa-
tion about the aggregation results and enables more effective error-feedback performance. More
discussion about the parameter 1M is provided in the supplementary document.
Both sto-sign and dp-sign can be used in Algorithm 2 and the corresponding algorithms are termed
as EF-Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, respectively. In the following, we show the convergence and
Byzantine resilience of Algorithm 2 when dp-sign is used. The results can be easily adapted for
sto-sign. Particularly, the following theorems can be proved.
Theorem 8. When Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 are satisfied, there exists a σ0 such that when σ ≥ σ0, by
running Algorithm 2 with η = 1
M
√
Td
, we have
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||∇F (w(t))||22
σ
≤ (F (w0)− F
∗)
√
d√
T
+
(1 + L+ L2β)
√
d√
T
, (13)
where β is some positive constant.
The proof of Theorem 8 follows the strategy of taking y(t) = w(t) − ηe˜(t) such that y(t) is updated
in the same way as w(t) in the non error-feedback scenario. A key technical challenge is to bound the
norm of the residual error ||e˜(t)||22. Utilizing the fact that the output of the compressor q(·) ∈ {−1, 1},
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we upper bound it by first proving that in this case, the server’s compressor is an α-approximate
compressor [18] for some α < 1.
Besides the fact that error-feedback is only used on the server’s side, another difference between
Algorithm 2 and those in [18, 19] is that it does not require the workers to share the magnitude
information about the gradients. On the one hand, it saves communication overhead. On the other
hand, it keeps the resilience against the re-scaling attacks. By following a similar strategy to the
proofs of Theorem 8 and considering the impact of Byzantine attackers, we obtain the Byzantine
resilience of Algorithm 2 as follows.
Theorem 9. At each iteration t, there exists a constant σ0 such that when σ > σ0, Algorithm 2
can at least tolerate ki = |
∑M
m=1∇fm(w(t))i|/σ Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of
the gradient. Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that Algorithm 2 can tolerate is given by
min1≤i≤dki.
Experimental results. For DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, we follow the idea of gradient clipping in
[31] to bound the sensitivity ∆2. After computing the gradient for each individual training sample in
the local dataset, each worker clips it in its L2 norm for a clipping threshold C to ensure that ∆2 ≤ C.
We set C = 4 in the experiments and the results are shown in Fig. 3. It can be observed from the
first two figures that when there is no Byzantine attackers, EF-DP-SIGNSGD outperforms DP-SIGNSGD
for all the examined ’s, which demonstrates its effectiveness. In addition, both DP-SIGNSGD and
EF-DP-SIGNSGD outperform SIGNSGD, while providing privacy guarantees.
Another observation is that the error-feedback variants do not necessarily perform better. For instance,
in the second figure of Fig. 3, when there is one Byzantine attacker and  = 1, the testing accuracy
of EF-DP-SIGNSGD is worse than that of DP-SIGNSGD. In the beginning of the training process, ki’s
in Theorem 9 are large enough such that the algorithm can tolerate the Byzantine attacker. As the
gradients decrease, the probability of wrong aggregation increases. In this case, the error-feedback
mechanism may carry the wrong aggregations to the future iterations and have a negative impact on
the learning process. Similar results are obtained for Sto-SIGNSGD when b = 0.003 in the last figure
of Fig. 3. In the meantime, for b = 0.001 and “Optimal b”, the error-feedback variant can tolerate
the Byzantine attacker and therefore provide better performance.
8 Conclusion
We propose a Stochastic-Sign SGD framework which utilizes two novel gradient compressors and
can deal with heterogeneous data distribution. The proposed algorithms are proved to converge in the
heterogeneous data distribution scenario with the same rate as SIGNSGD in the homogeneous data
distribution case. In particular, the proposed differentially private compressor dp-sign improves the
privacy and the accuracy simultaneously without sacrificing any communication efficiency. Then, we
further improve the learning performance of the proposed method by incorporating the error-feedback
scheme. In addition, the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is shown analytically. It is
expected that the proposed algorithms can find wide applications in the design of communication
efficient, differentially private and Byzantine resilient FL algorithms.
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Supplementary Material
The supplementary material is organized as follows. In Section 1, we formally provide the definition
of local differential privacy [10]. In Section 2, we provide the proofs of the theoretical results
presented in the main document. Discussions about the extended differentially private compressor
dp-sign when δ = 0 are provided in Section 3. Discussions about the server’s compressor 1M sign(·)
in Algorithm 2 are provided in Section 4. The details about the implementation of our experiments
and some additional experimental results are presented in Section 5.
1 Definition of Local Differential Privacy
In this work, we study the privacy guarantee of the proposed algorithms from the lens of local
differential privacy [10], which provides a strong notion of individual privacy in data analysis. The
definition of local differential privacy is formally given as follows.
Definition 3. Given a set of local datasets D provided with a notion of neighboring local datasets
ND ⊂ D × D that differ in only one data point. For a query function f : D → X , a mechanism
M : X → O to release the answer of the query is defined to be (, δ)-locally differentially private if
for any measurable subset S ⊆ O and two neighboring local datasets (D1, D2) ∈ ND,
P (M(f(D1)) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(f(D2)) ∈ S) + δ. (14)
A key quantity in characterizing local differential privacy for many mechanisms is the sensitivity of
the query f in a given norm lr, which is defined as
∆r = max
(D1,D2)∈ND
||f(D1)− f(D2)||r. (15)
For more details about the concept of differential privacy, the reader is referred to [10] for a survey.
2 Proofs
2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Let u1, u2, · · · , uM beM known and fixed real numbers and consider random variables
uˆm = sto-sign(um, b), 1 ≤ m ≤M . Then we have
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆm
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
um
))
<
[(
1− 1
x
)
e
1
x
]M
2
, (16)
where x = bM|∑Mm=1 um| .
We first provide some intuition about the proof. Given the majority vote rule, the aggregation result is
wrong if more than half of the workers share the wrong signs. In addition, based on the definition
of sto-sign, we can obtain the probability of each worker sharing 1 or -1. Therefore, the number
of workers that share the wrong signs can be modeled as a Poisson binomial variable, denoted as Z.
The key difficulty is that the correct sign sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 um) is unknown. However, it can be shown
that the mean of the number of workers sharing either -1 or 1 depends on 1M
∑M
m=1 um rather than
on each individual um. That being said, we can always obtain the expectation of Z as a function of
1
M
∑M
m=1 um. As a result, we can invoke the Markov inequality and obtain (16) after some algebra.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uK < 0 ≤ uK+1 ≤ · · · ≤ uM and
1
M
∑M
m=1 um < 0. Note that similar analysis can be done when
1
M
∑M
i=m um > 0. Further define a
series of random variables {Xm}Mm=1 given by
Xm =

1, if uˆm 6= sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 um
)
,
0, if uˆm = sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 um
)
.
(17)
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In particular, Xm can be considered as the outcome of one Bernoulli trial with successful probability
P (Xm = 1). Let Z =
∑M
m=1Xm and we have
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆm
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
um
))
= P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
. (18)
Note that according to the definition of sto-sign, b is large enough such that b > maxm |um|. The
probability of Xm = 1 is given by
P (Xm = 1) =
b+ um
2b
. (19)
Then, Z follows the Poisson binomial distribution with mean and variance given by
µ =
M∑
m=1
P (Xm = 1) =
M
2
+
∑M
m=1 um
2b
,
σ2 =
M∑
m=1
(b− um)(b+ um)
4b2
.
(20)
For any variable a > 0, we have
E
[
eaZ
]
= E
[
ea
∑M
m=1Xm
]
= E
[ M∏
m=1
eaXm
]
=
M∏
m=1
E
[
eaXm
]
, (21)
where the last equality is due to the independence among Xm’s. In addition,
E
[
eaXm
]
= P (Xm = 1)e
a + P (Xm = 0) = 1 + P (Xm = 1)(e
a − 1) ≤ eP (Xm=1)(ea−1), (22)
where the last inequality is due to the inequality 1 + y ≤ ey .
Combining (21) and (22), we have
E
[
eaZ
]
=
M∏
m=1
E
[
eaXm
] ≤ M∏
m=1
eP (Xm=1)(e
a−1) ≤ e(ea−1)µ. (23)
Therefore,
P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
= P
(
eaZ ≥ eMa2 ) ≤ E[eaZ]
e
Ma
2
≤ e
(ea−1)µ
e
Ma
2
, (24)
where we invoke the Markov’s inequality.
Since
∑M
m=1 um
2b < 0 by our assumption, it can be verified that
M
2µ > 1. Let a = ln(
M
2µ ) > 0, we have
P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
≤ e
(
e
ln(M
2µ
)−1
)
µ
e
M ln(M
2µ
)
2
=
e
M
2 −µ
(M2µ )
M
2
=
e−
∑M
m=1 um
2b
( M
M+ 1b
∑M
m=1 um
)
M
2
. (25)
Let x = |
∑M
m=1 um|
bM and it can be verified that x < 1 since b > maxm|um|. Then (25) can be
reduced to
P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
≤ [(1− x)ex]M2 . (26)
2.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Given the same {um}Mm=1 and {uˆm}Mm=1 as those in Theorem 1, for a sufficiently large
b, we have P
(
sign
(
1
M
∑M
m=1 uˆm
) 6= sign( 1M ∑Mm=1 um)) < 12 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uK < 0 ≤ uK+1 ≤ · · · ≤ uM .
According to the definition of sto-sign, we have
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uˆm = sto-sign(um, b) =
{
1, with probability b+um2b ,
−1,with probability b−um2b ,
(27)
Further define a series of random variables {Xˆm}Mm=1 given by
Xˆm =
{
1, if uˆm = 1,
0, if uˆm = −1.
(28)
In particular, Xˆm can be considered as the outcome of one Bernoulli trial with successful probability
P (Xˆm = 1). Let Zˆ =
∑M
m=1 Xˆm, then
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆm
)
= 1
)
= P
(
Zˆ ≥ M
2
)
=
M∑
H=M+12
P (Zˆ = H). (29)
In addition,
P (Zˆ = H) =
∑
A∈FH
∏
i∈A(b+ ui)
∏
j∈Ac(b− uj)
(2b)M
=
aM,Hb
M + aM−1,HbM−1 + · · ·+ a0,Hb0
(2b)M
,
(30)
in which FH is the set of all subsets of H integers that can be selected from {1, 2, 3, ...,M};
am,H ,∀0 ≤ m ≤M is some constant. It can be easily verified that aM,H =
(
M
H
)
.
When b is sufficiently large, P (Zˆ = H) is dominated by the first two terms in (30). In particular, ∀m,
we have∑
A∈FH
∏
i∈A
(b+ ui)
∏
j∈Ac
(b− uj) = (b+ um)
∑
A∈FH ,m∈A
∏
i∈A/{m}
(b+ ui)
∏
j∈Ac
(b− uj)
+ (b− um)
∑
A∈FH ,m/∈A
∏
i∈A
(b+ ui)
∏
j∈Ac/{m}
(b− uj).
(31)
As a result, when M+12 ≤ H ≤M − 1, the um related term in aM−1,H is given by[(
M − 1
H − 1
)
−
(
M − 1
H
)]
um. (32)
When H = M , the um related term in aM−1,H is given by[(
M − 1
H − 1
)]
um. (33)
By summing over m, we have
aM−1,H =
[(
M − 1
H − 1
)
−
(
M − 1
H
)] M∑
m=1
um, (34)
and
aM−1,H =
[(
M − 1
H − 1
)] M∑
m=1
um, (35)
when M+12 ≤ H ≤M − 1 and H = M , respectively.
By summing over H , we have
M∑
H=M+12
aM,H =
M∑
H=M+12
(
M
H
)
= 2M−1, (36)
M∑
H=M+12
aM−1,H =
(
M − 1
M−1
2
) M∑
m=1
um (37)
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As a result,
P
(
Zˆ ≥ M
2
)
=
M∑
H=M+12
P (Zˆ = H) =
2M−1bM +
(M−1
M−1
2
)∑M
m=1 umb
M−1
(2b)M
+O
(
1
b2
)
=
1
2
+
(M−1
M−1
2
)
2Mb
M∑
m=1
um +O
(
1
b2
)
.
(38)
Therefore, if the second term dominates the third term (i.e., b is sufficiently large), P
(
Zˆ ≥ M2
)
> 12
when
∑M
m=1 um > 0; P
(
Zˆ ≥ M2
)
< 12 when
∑M
m=1 um < 0. That being said, the probability of
wrong aggregation is always smaller than 1/2.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1√
Td
. Then
for any M , by running Sto-SIGNSGD for T iterations, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
c||∇F (w(t))||1 ≤ (F (w
(0))− F ∗)√d√
T
+
L
√
d
2
√
T
+ 2bd∆(M), (39)
where c is some positive constant, and ∆(M) is the solution to
[(
1− x)ex]M2 = 12 .
The proof of Theorem 3 follows the well known strategy of relating the norm of the gradient to
the expected improvement of the global objective in a single iteration. Then accumulating the
improvement over the iterations yields the convergence rate of the algorithm.
Proof. According to Assumption 2, we have
F (w(t+1))− F (w(t))
≤< ∇F (w(t)), w(t+1) − w(t) > +L
2
||w(t+1) − w(t)||2
= −η < ∇F (w(t)), sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
sto-sign(g(t)m )
)
> +
L
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ηsign( 1M
M∑
m=1
sto-sign(g(t)m )
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
= −η < ∇F (w(t)), sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
sto-sign(g(t)m )
)
> +
Lη2d
2
= −η||∇F (w(t))||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ 2η
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1sign( 1M ∑Mm=1 sto-sign(g(t)m )i)6=sign(∇F (w(t))i),
(40)
where ∇F (w(t))i is the i-th entry of the vector ∇F (w(t)) and η is the learning rate. Taking
expectation on both sides yeilds
E[F (w(t+1))− F (w(t))] ≤ −η||∇F (w(t))||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ 2η
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
sto-sign(g(t)m )i
)
6= sign(∇F (w(t))i)
)
.
(41)
Let ∆(M) denote the solution to
[(
1− x)ex]M2 = 12 . Since [(1− x)ex] is a decreasing function of
x for x < 1, it can be verified that
[(
1 − x)ex]M2 < 12 when x > ∆(M) and [(1 − x)ex]M2 ≥ 12
15
otherwise. According to Theorem 1, we have two possible scenarios as follows.
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
sto-sign(g(t)m )i
)
6= sign(∇F (w(t))i)
)≤ 12 − c12 , if
|∇F (w(t))i|
b > ∆(M),
≤ 12 + c22 , if |∇F (w
(t))i|
b ≤ ∆(M),
(42)
in which and c1, c2 < 1 are some positive constants.
Plugging (42) into (41), we can obtain
E[F (w(t+1))− F (w(t))]
≤ −η||∇F (w(t))||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ η
[
(1− c1)
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b >∆(M)
+ (1− c2)
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b ≤∆(M)
]
+ 2ηc2
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b ≤∆(M)
≤ −η||∇F (w(t))||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ η(1− c)||∇F (w(t))||1 + 2ηc2
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b ≤∆(M)
= −ηc||∇F (w(t))||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ 2ηc2
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b ≤∆(M)
,
(43)
where c = min{c1, c2}. Adjusting the above inequality and averaging both sides over t =
1, 2, · · · , T , we can obtain
1
T
T∑
t=1
ηc||∇F (w(t))||1 ≤ E[F (w
(0))− F (w(T+1))]
T
+
Lη2d
2
+
2ηc2
T
T∑
t=1
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i|1 |∇F (w(t))i|
b ≤∆(M)
≤ E[F (w
(0))− F (w(T+1))]
T
+
Lη2d
2
+ 2ηdb∆(M).
(44)
Letting η = 1√
dT
and dividing both sides by η gives
1
T
T∑
t=1
c||∇F (w(t))||1 ≤ E[F (w
(0))− F (w(T+1))]√d√
T
+
L
√
d
2
√
T
+ 2db∆(M)
≤ (F (w
(0))− F ∗)√d√
T
+
L
√
d
2
√
T
+ 2db∆(M),
(45)
which completes the proof.
2.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , δ) is (, δ)-differentially private for any , δ ∈
(0, 1).
Proof. We start from the one-dimension scenario and consider any a, b that satisfy ||a− b||2 ≤ ∆2.
Without loss of generality, assume that dp-sign(a, , δ) = dp-sign(b, , δ) = 1. Then we have
P (dp-sign(a, , δ) = 1) = Φ
(
a
σ
)
=
∫ a
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx,
P (dp-sign(b, , δ) = 1) = Φ
(
b
σ
)
=
∫ b
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx.
(46)
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Furthermore,
P (dp-sign(a, , δ) = 1)
P (dp-sign(b, , δ) = 1)
=
∫ a
−∞ e
− x2
2σ2 dx∫ b
−∞ e
− x2
2σ2 dx
=
∫∞
0
e−
(x−a)2
2σ2 dx∫∞
0
e−
(x−b)2
2σ2 dx
. (47)
According to Theorem A.1 in [10], given the parameters , δ and σ, it can be verified that e− ≤∣∣P (dp-sign(a,,δ)=1)
P (dp-sign(b,,δ)=1)
∣∣ ≤ e with probability at least 1− δ.
For the multi-dimension scenario, consider any vector a and b such that ||a − b||2 ≤ ∆2 and
v ∈ {−1, 1}d, we have
P (dp-sign(a, , δ) = v)
P (dp-sign(b, , δ) = v)
=
∫
D
e−
||x−a||22
2σ2 dx∫
D
e−
||x−b||22
2σ2 dx
, (48)
where D is some integral area depending on v. Similarly, it can be shown that e− ≤∣∣P (dp-sign(a,,δ)=v)
P (dp-sign(b,,δ)=v)
∣∣ ≤ e with probability at least 1− δ.
2.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Let u1, u2, · · · , uM be M known and fixed real numbers. Further define random
variables uˆi = dp-sign(ui, , δ),∀1 ≤ i ≤M . Then there always exist a constant σ0 such that when
σ ≥ σ0, P (sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 uˆi) 6= sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 ui)) <
[(
1− x)ex]M2 , where x = |∑Mm=1 um|σM .
The proof of Theorem 5 follows a similar strategy to that of Theorem 1. The difficulty we need to
overcome is that unlike sto-sign, the expectation of the number of workers that share the wrong
signs is not a function of 1M
∑M
m=1 ui due to the nonlinearity introduced by Φ(·). However, when σ
is large enough, we show that it can be upper bounded as a function of 1M
∑M
m=1 ui.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uK < 0 ≤ uK+1 ≤ · · · ≤ uM and
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui < 0. Note that similar analysis can be done when
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui > 0. Further define a
series of random variables {Xi}Mi=1 given by
Xi =
{
1, if uˆi 6= sign
(
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui
)
,
0, if uˆi = sign
(
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui
)
.
(49)
In particular, Xi can be considered as the outcome of one Bernoulli trial with successful probability
P (Xi = 1). Let Z =
∑M
i=1Xi and we have
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆi
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ui
))
= P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
. (50)
In addition,
P (Xm = 1) = Φ
(
um
σ
)
. (51)
Then, Z follows the Poisson binomial distribution with mean and variance given by
µ =
M∑
m=1
P (Xm = 1) =
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
um
σ
)
,
σ2 =
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
um
σ
)(
1− Φ
(
um
σ
))
.
(52)
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Let n denote a zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ, according to the assumption that u1 ≤
u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uK < 0 ≤ uK+1 ≤ · · · ≤ uM , we have
Φ
(
um
σ
)
=
1
2
− P (um < n < 0), ∀1 ≤ m ≤ K,
Φ
(
um
σ
)
=
1
2
+ P (0 < n < um), ∀K + 1 ≤ m ≤M.
(53)
Therefore,
µ =
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
um
σ
)
=
M
2
−
[ K∑
m=1
P (um < n < 0)−
M∑
m=K+1
P (0 < n < um)
]
. (54)
Note that for any Gaussian noise, P (a1 < n < 0) + P (a2 < n < 0) ≥ P (a1 + a2 < n < 0) for
any a1 < 0, a2 < 0. Therefore, we consider the worst case scenario such that
∑K
m=1 P (um < n <
0)−∑Mm=K+1 P (0 < n < um) is minimized, i.e., K = 1. In this case,
K∑
m=1
P (um < n < 0)−
M∑
m=K+1
P (0 < n < um)
= P
(
u1 < n ≤ −
M∑
m=2
um
)
+ P
(
−
M∑
m=2
um < n < 0
)
−
M∑
m=2
P (0 < n < um)
>
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣[ 1√2piσ e− u
2
1
2σ2
]
+ P
(
−
M∑
m=2
um < n < 0
)
−
M∑
m=2
P (0 < n < um)
>
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣[ 1√2piσ e− u
2
1
2σ2
]
−
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=2
um
∣∣∣∣ 1√2piσ
[
1− e−
(
∑M
m=2 um)
2
2σ2
]
=
1√
2piσ
[∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣e− u212σ2 + ∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=2
um
∣∣∣∣[e− (∑Mm=2 um)22σ2 − 1]],
(55)
where the first inequality is due to f(a) > f(u1) for a ∈ (u1,
∑M
m=1 um] and the second inequality
is due to f(a) < 1√
2piσ
for any a > 0, where f(·) is the probability density function of the normal
distribution.
In particular, as σ → ∞, |∑Mm=1 um|e− u212σ2 increases and converges to |∑Mm=1 um| while
|∑Mm=2 um|[e− (∑Mm=2 um)22σ2 − 1] increases and converges to 0. Therefore, we have
1√
2piσ
[∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣e− u212σ2 + ∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=2
um
∣∣∣∣[e− (∑Mm=2 um)22σ2 − 1]] σ→∞−−−−→ −∑Mm=1 um√2piσ . (56)
As a result, there exists a σ0 such that when σ ≥ σ0, we have
µ =
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
um
σ
)
≤ M
2
+
∑M
m=1 um
2σ
. (57)
Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆi
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ui
))
<
[(
1− x)ex]M2 , (58)
where x = |
∑M
m=1 um|
σM .
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2.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. There exists a positive constant s0 such that when s > s0, Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD
can at least tolerate ki Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient and ki satisfies
ki <
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
s
,
[(
1− x)ex]M−ki2 < 1
2
, (59)
where x = |
∑M
m=1∇fm(w(t))i|−ski
(M−ki)s , s = σ for DP-SIGNSGD and s = bi ≥ maxm|(g
(t)
m )i| for Sto-
SIGNSGD.
Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that the algorithms can tolerate is given by min1≤i≤dki.
We first provide some intuition about the proof. It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 3 that the
convergence of Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD is guaranteed if the probability of more than half of the
workers sharing wrong signs is less than 0.5. On the i-th coordinate of the gradient, if there are ki
Byzantine workers that always share the wrong signs, then at most M−ki2 normal workers can share
wrong signs such that the aggregated result is still correct.
Proof. By replacing M with M − ki in (24), we can obtain
P
(
Z ≥ M − ki
2
)
≤ e
(ea−1)µ
e
(M−ki)a
2
, (60)
where µ = E[Z]. It is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 that there exists a positive
constant s0 such that when s > s0, µ ≤ M2 −
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
2s . Let a = ln(
M−ki
2µ ), we have
P
(
Z ≥ M − ki
2
)
≤ e
M−ki
2 −µ
(M−ki2µ )
M−ki
2
=
(
e
M−2µ−ki
M−ki
(M−ki2µ )
)M−ki
2
≤ [(1− x)ex]M−ki2 , (61)
where x =
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
s −ki
M−ki . In addition, the above inequality requires ln(
M−ki
2µ ) > 0 and
therefore ki <
|∑Mm=1∇fm(w(t))i|
s .
2.7 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1√
Td
. Then, when
b = b · 1 and b is sufficiently large, Sto-SIGNSGD converges to the (local) optimum with a rate of
O( 1√
T
) if either of the following two conditions is satisfied.
• P (sign( 1M ∑Mm=1(gtm)i) 6= sign(∇F (wt)i) < 0.5,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d.
• The mini-batch size of stochastic gradient at each iteration is at least T .
Proof. Note that in the proof of Theorem 3, we obtain
E[F (wt+1)− F (wt)] ≤ −η||∇F (wt)||1 + Lη
2d
2
+ 2η
d∑
i=1
|∇F (wt)i|P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm)i
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i
))
,
(62)
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where q(gtm) = sto-sign(g
t
m). For the ease of notation, let
pi,1 = P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm)i
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
(gtm)i
))
,
pi,2 = P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
(gtm)i
))
<
1
2
,
pi = P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm)i
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i
))
.
(63)
Then
pi = pi,1(1− pi,2) + pi,2(1− pi,1) = pi,1 + pi,2 − 2pi,1pi,2. (64)
We first prove the convergence under the first condition. According to Theorem 2, we have pi,1 < 12 .
In this case, it can be verified that pi is an increasing function of both pi,1 and pi,2 and therefore
pi <
1
2 +
1
2 − 12 = 12 . Following similar analysis to that in the proof of Theorem 3, it can be shown
that Sto-SIGNSGD converges to the (local) optimum with a rate of O(
√
d√
T
).
Then, we prove the convergence under the second condition. According to (64), it is obvious that
pi ≤ pi,1 + pi,2. Therefore, we have
d∑
i=1
|∇F (wt)i|pi ≤
d∑
i=1
|∇F (wt)i|pi,1 +
d∑
i=1
|∇F (wt)i|pi,2. (65)
In particular,
pi,2 = P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
(gtm)i
))
≤ P
(∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i − 1
M
M∑
m=1
(gtm)i
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
∇fm(wt)i
∣∣∣∣)
≤ E[|
1
M
∑M
m=1∇fm(wt)i − 1M
∑M
m=1(g
t
m)i|]
| 1M
∑M
m=1∇fm(wt)i|
≤
√
E[( 1M
∑M
m=1∇fm(wt)i − 1M
∑M
m=1(g
t
m)i)
2]
| 1M
∑M
m=1∇fm(wt)i|
≤ σi√
MT |∇F (wt)i|
.
(66)
As a result, the second term in (65) is bounded by O( ||σ¯||1√
MT
). Following the same analysis as that in
the proof of Theorem 3, it can be shown that Sto-SIGNSGD converges with a rate of O( 1√
T
).
2.8 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. When Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 are satisfied, there exists a σ0 such that when σ ≥ σ0, by
running Algorithm 2 with η = 1
M
√
Td
, we have
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||∇F (w(t))||22
σ
≤ (F (w
(0))− F ∗)√d√
T
+
(1 + L+ L2β)
√
d√
T
, (67)
where β is some positive constant.
The proof of Theorem 8 follows the strategy of taking y(t) = w(t) − η˜e˜(t) such that y(t) is updated
in the same way as w(t) in the non error-feedback scenario. A key technical challenge is to bound the
norm of the residual error ||e˜(t)||22. Utilizing the fact that the output of the compressor q(·) ∈ {−1, 1},
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we upper bound it by first proving that in this case, the server’s compressor is an α-approximate
compressor [18] for some α < 1. Therefore, before proving Theorem 8, we first prove the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let y(t) = w(t) − ηM e˜(t), we have
y(t+1) = y(t) − η
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ). (68)
Proof.
y(t+1) = w(t+1) − ηM e˜(t+1)
= w(t) − ηg˜(t) − ηM e˜(t+1)
= w(t) − η
( M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +M e˜
(t) −M e˜(t+1)
)
− ηM e˜(t+1)
= w(t) − η
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)− ηM e˜(t)
= y(t) − η
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ).
(69)
Lemma 2. There exists a positive constant β > 0 such that E[||e˜(t)||22] ≤ βd,∀t.
Proof. We first prove that for the 1-bit compressor q(g(t)m ), there exists some constant α such that the
following inequality always holds.∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )+ e˜
(t)− 1
M
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )+ e˜
(t)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
≤ (1−α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )+ e˜
(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
,
(70)
where α < 1 is some positive constant.
For the ease of presentation, we let r(t)i denote the i-th entry of
1
M
∑M
m=1 q(g
(t)
m ) + e˜
(t). Then, we
can rewrite the left hand side of (70) as follows,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m ) + e˜
(t) − 1
M
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m ) + e˜
(t)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
=
d∑
i=1
(
r
(t)
i −
1
M
sign(r
(t)
i )
)2
.
(71)
In particular, we have(
r
(t)
i −
1
M
sign(r
(t)
i )
)2
=
(
(r
(t)
i )
2 +
1
M2
− 2|r
(t)
i |
M
)
=
[
1− 1
M(r
(t)
i )
2
(
2|r(t)i |−
1
M
)]
(r
(t)
i )
2.
(72)
If 2|r(t)i | − 1M > 0,∀i, then there exist a positive constant α such that
d∑
i=1
(
r
(t)
i −
1
M
sign(r
(t)
i )
)2
≤
d∑
i=1
(1− α)(r(t)i )2 = (1− α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m ) + e˜
(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
. (73)
In order to prove that 2|r(t)i | − 1M > 0,∀i, we first show that M(e˜(t))i is an even number for any t
by induction. In particular, according to Assumption 4 and (e˜(0))i = 0, Mr
(0)
i =
∑M
m=1 q(g
(0)
m )i is
an odd number. Therefore, M(e˜(1))i =
∑M
m=1 q(g
(0)
m )i − sign(
∑M
m=1 q(g
(t)
m )i) is an even number.
In addition,
M(e˜(t+1))i =
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )i +M(e˜
(t))i − sign
( M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )i +M(e˜
(t))i
)
. (74)
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Given that M(e˜(t))i is even, we can show that M(e˜(t+1))i is even as well. Therefore, Mr
(t)
i =∑M
m=1 q(g
(t)
m )i +M(e˜
(t))i is odd and 2|r(t)i | ≥ 2M > 1M , ∀t, i.
Given (70), we can show that
E||e˜(t+1)||22 ≤ (1− α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m ) + e˜
(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
≤ (1− α)(1 + ρ)E||e˜(t)||22 + (1− α)
(
1 +
1
ρ
)
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
≤
t∑
j=0
[(1− α)(1 + ρ)]t−j(1− α)
(
1 +
1
ρ
)
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
q(g(t)m )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
≤
(1− α)
(
1 + 1ρ
)
d
1− (1− α)(1 + ρ) ,
(75)
where we invoke Young’s inequality recurrently and ρ can be any positive constant. Therefore, there
exists some constant β > 0 such that E[||e˜(t)||22] ≤ βd,∀t.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof. Let y(t) = w(t) − ηM e˜(t), and η˜ = Mη, according to Lemma 1, we have
E[F (y(t+1))− F (y(t))]
≤ −η˜E
[
< ∇F (y(t)), 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) >
]
+
L
2
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣η˜ 1M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
]
= η˜E
[
< ∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t)), 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) >
]
+
Lη˜2
2
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
]
− η˜E
[
< ∇F (w(t)), 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) >
]
.
(76)
We first bound the first term, in particular, we have
< ∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t)), 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) >
≤ η˜
2
|| 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)||22 +
1
2η˜
||∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t))||22
≤ η˜
2
|| 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)||22 +
L2
2η˜
||y(t) − w(t)||22
=
η˜
2
|| 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)||22 +
L2η˜
2
||e˜(t)||22
≤ η˜
2
|| 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)||22 +
L2η˜βd
2
,
(77)
where the second inequality is due to the L-smoothness of F .
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Then, we can bound the last term as follows.
− E
[
< ∇F (w(t)), 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) >
]
= −E
[ d∑
i=1
∇F (w(t))i 1
M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign((g(t)m )i; , δ)
]
= −
d∑
i=1
∇F (w(t))i 1
M
M∑
m=1
(
2Φ
(∇fm(w(t))i
σ
)
− 1
)
≤ −
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i| |∇F (w
(t))i|
σ
= −||∇F (w
(t))||22
σ
,
(78)
where the inequality is due to (57) in the proof of Theorem 4.
Plugging (77) and (78) into (76) yields
E[F (y(t+1))− F (y(t))]
≤ η˜
2 + Lη˜2
2
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
]
+
L2η˜2βd
2
− η˜||∇F (w
(t))||22
σ
≤ (η˜
2 + Lη˜2 + L2η˜2β)d
2
− η˜||∇F (w
(t))||22
σ
.
(79)
Rewriting (79) and taking average over t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T − 1 on both sides yields
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||∇F (w(t))||22
σ
≤
T−1∑
t=0
E[F (y(t))− F (y(t+1))]
η˜T
+
(η˜ + Lη˜ + L2η˜β)d
2
.
(80)
Taking η˜ = 1√
Td
and w(0) = y(0) yields
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||∇F (w(t))||22
σ
≤ (F (w
(0))− F ∗)√d√
T
+
(1 + L+ L2β)
√
d√
T
. (81)
2.9 Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. At each iteration t, there exists a constant σ0 such that when σ > σ0, Algorithm 2
can at least tolerate ki = |
∑M
m=1∇fm(w(t))i|/σ Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of
the gradient. Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that Algorithm 2 can tolerate is given by
min1≤i≤dki.
By following a similar strategy to the proof of Theorem 8 and taking the impact of Byzantine attackers
into consideration, the convergence of Algorithm 2 in the presence of Byzantine attackers can be
established.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the first M workers are normal and the last B are
Byzantine. Following a similar procedure to the proof of Theorem 8, we can show that
E[F (y(t+1))− F (y(t))]
≤ −η˜E
[
< ∇F (y(t)), 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]
>
]
+
L
2
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣η˜ 1M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
]
= η˜E
[
< ∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t)), 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]
>
]
+
Lη˜2
2
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
]
− η˜E
[
< ∇F (w(t)), 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]
>
]
.
(82)
For the first term, we have
< ∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t)), 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]
>
≤ η˜
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
1
2η˜
||∇F (w(t))−∇F (y(t))||2
≤ η˜d
2
+
L2
2η˜
||y(t) − w(t)||2
=
η˜d
2
+
L2η˜
2
||e˜(t)||2
≤ η˜d
2
+
L2η˜βd
2
.
(83)
For the third term, if B < |
∑M
m=1(g
(t)
m )i|
σ , we have
− E
[
< ∇F (w(t)), 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign(g(t)m ; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign(g(t)j )
]
>
]
= −E
[ d∑
i=1
∇F (w(t))i 1
M +B
[ M∑
m=1
dp-sign((g(t)m )i; , δ) +
B∑
j=1
byzantine-sign((g(t)j )i)
]
>
]
≤ −
d∑
i=1
|∇F (w(t))i| 1
M +B
[ |∑Mm=1(g(t)m )i|
σ
−B
]
≤ −c||∇F (w(t))||1,
(84)
where c is some positive constant.
Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 8, the convergence of Algorithm 2 can
be established.
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3 Discussions about dp-sign with δ = 0
In this section, we present the differentially private compressor dp-sign with δ = 0.
Definition 4. For any given gradient gtm, the compressor dp-sign outputs dp-sign(gtm, , 0). In
particular, the i-th entry of dp-sign(gtm, , 0) is given by
dp-sign(gtm, , 0)i =
 1, with probability
1
2 +
1
2sign((g
t
m)i)
(
1− e− |(g
t
m)i|
λ
)
,
−1, with probability 12 − 12sign((gtm)i)
(
1− e− |(g
t
m)i|
λ
)
,
(85)
where λ = ∆1 and ∆1 is the sensitivity measures defined in (15).
Theorem 10. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , 0) is (, 0)-differentially private.
Proof. Consider any vector a and b such that ||a− b||1 ≤ ∆1 and v ∈ {−1, 1}d, we have
P (dp-sign(a, , 0) = v)
P (dp-sign(b, , 0) = v)
=
∫
D
e−
||x−a||
λ dx∫
D
e−
||x−b||
λ dx
, (86)
where D is some integral area depending on v. It can be verified that e− ≤ | e−
||x−a||
λ
e−
||x−b||
λ
| ≤ e always
holds, which indicates that e− ≤ |P (dp-sign(a,,0)=v)P (dp-sign(b,,0)=v) | ≤ e.
Theorem 11. Let u1, u2, · · · , uM be M known and fixed real numbers. Further define random
variables uˆi = dp-sign(ui, , δ),∀1 ≤ i ≤M . Then there always exist a constant σ0 such that when
σ ≥ σ0, P (sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 uˆi) 6= sign( 1M
∑M
m=1 ui)) <
[(
1 − x)ex]M2 , where x = |∑Mm=1 um|γλM
and γ is some positive constant.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uK < 0 ≤ uK+1 ≤ · · · ≤ uM and
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui < 0. Note that similar analysis can be done when
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui > 0. Further define a
series of random variables {Xi}Mi=1 given by
Xi =
{
1, if uˆi 6= sign
(
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui
)
,
0, if uˆi = sign
(
1
M
∑M
i=1 ui
)
.
(87)
In particular, Xi can be considered as the outcome of one Bernoulli trial with successful probability
P (Xi = 1). Let Z =
∑M
i=1Xi and we have
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆi
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ui
))
= P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
. (88)
Z follows the Poisson binomial distribution with mean and variance given by
µ =
M∑
m=1
P (Xm = 1) =
M
2
−
[ K∑
m=1
P (um < n < 0)−
M∑
i=K+1
P (0 < n < um)
]
,
σ2 =
M∑
m=1
P (n > −um)(1− P (n > −um)),
(89)
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where n ∼ Laplace(0, λ). Similar to the analysis for dp-sign with δ > 0, we can show that
K∑
m=1
P (um < n < 0)−
M∑
m=K+1
P (0 < n < um)
= P
(
u1 < n ≤ −
M∑
m=2
um
)
+ P
(
−
M∑
m=2
um < n < 0
)
−
M∑
m=2
P (0 < n < um)
>
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣[ 12λe− |u1|λ
]
+ P
(
−
M∑
m=2
um < n < 0
)
−
M∑
m=2
P (0 < n < um)
>
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣[ 12λe− |u1|λ
]
−
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=2
um
∣∣∣∣ 12λ
[
1− e− |
∑M
m=2 um|
λ
]
=
1
2λ
[∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
um
∣∣∣∣e− |u1|λ + ∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=2
um
∣∣∣∣[e− |∑Mm=2 um|λ − 1]].
(90)
As a result, there exists a λ0 such that when λ ≥ λ0, we have
µ =
M∑
m=1
P (Xm = 1) ≤ M
2
+
∑M
m=1 um
2λγ
, (91)
where γ is some constant larger than 1.
Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that there exists a positive
constant M0 such that when M ≥M0
P
(
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
uˆm
)
6= sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
um
))
= P
(
Z ≥ M
2
)
<
[(
1− x)ex]M2 , (92)
where x = |
∑M
m=1 um|
γλM and γ is some positive constant.
4 Discussions about the server’s compressor 1
M
sign(·) in Algorithm 2
Recall that the update rule of the residual error is given by
e˜t+1 =
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm) + e˜
t − a
M
sign
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm) + e˜
t
)
, (93)
where a = 1 in the proposed Algorithm.
Theorem 12. In Algorithm 2, when the total number of workers is odd and a = 12k+1 for any
non-negative integer k, the server’s compressor aM sign(·) is an α-approximate compressor for some
α > 0.
Proof. The goal is to show that aM sign(·) is an α-approximate compressor, i.e., for rt =
1
M
∑M
m=1 q(g
t
m) + e˜
t,∣∣∣∣rt − a
M
sign(rt)
∣∣∣∣2
2
=
d∑
i=1
(
rti −
a
M
sign(rti)
)2
≤ (1− α)||rt||22 = (1− α)
d∑
i=1
(rti)
2, (94)
where rti is the i-th entry of r
t. In addition,(
rti −
a
M
sign(rti)
)2
=
(
(rti)
2 − 2a|r
t
i|
M
+
a2
M2
)
=
(
1− a
M(rti)
2
(
2|rti| −
a
M
))
(rti)
2. (95)
It can be seen that a sufficient condition for (94) with some α > 0 is given by
2|rti| −
a
M
> 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d. (96)
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Given that the total number of workers is odd, it is obvious that (2k + 1)Mr0i is an odd number. As
a result, (2k + 1)M(e˜(1))i = (2k + 1)Mr0i − sign(r0i ) is an even number. Similar to the proof of
Lemma 2, it can be shown by induction that (2k + 1)Mrti is odd for any t. Therefore,
2|rti| ≥
2
(2k + 1)M
>
a
M
. (97)
For a 6= 12k+1 , we consider four cases as follows.
Case 1: a ≥ 2. In this case, since (e˜0)i = 0, then if 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
0
m)i =
1
M , (96) is not satisfied.
Case 2: 1 < a < 2. In this case, we consider a sequence of { 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
t
m)i}nt=0, given by
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(gtm)i =
1
M
,∀0 ≤ t ≤ n. (98)
Then
(e˜(1))i =
1− a
M
, r
(1)
i =
2− a
M
. (99)
Suppose that 2|rti| > aM ,∀t. Now we show that given (e˜t)i = t−taM , rti = t+1−taM , and a < t+1t ,
we have (e˜t+1)i = t+1−t+1aM , r
t+1
i =
t+2−t+1a
M and a <
t+2
t+1 . To satisfy 2|rti| > aM , we have
a < 2t+22t+1 <
t+2
t+1 . In addition, according to (93), (e˜
t+1)i = r
t
i − aM sign(rti) = t+1−t+1aM . Then,
rt+1i =
t+2−t+1a
M . As a result, by induction, we can show that a <
n+1
n . As n increases, a decreases
and approaches 1.
Case 3: 12 < a < 1. Again, we consider the sequence of { 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
t
m)i}nt=0 given by (98).
Then similarly, it can be shown that
(e˜t)i =
t− ta
M
,∀1 ≤ t ≤ n+ 1. (100)
Let 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
(n+1)
m )i = − 1M , we have
r
(n+1)
i =
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(n+1)m )i + (e˜
(n+1))i =
n− (n+ 1)a
M
. (101)
Taking 2|r(n+1)i | > aM yields
a
{
> 2n2n+1 ≥ n+1n+2 , if a > nn+1 ,
< 2n2n+3 , if a <
n
n+1 .
(102)
When n = 1, nn+1 =
1
2 . According to (102), a >
n
n+1 is a sufficient condition of a >
n+1
n+2 .
Therefore, as n increases, a increases and approaches 1.
Case 4: 12k+2 < a ≤ 12k , for any positive integer k. Again, we consider the sequence of
{ 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
t
m)i}nt=0 given by (98). Similarly,
(e˜t)i =
t− ta
M
,∀1 ≤ t ≤ n+ 1. (103)
Let 1M
∑M
m=1 q(g
(n+1)
m )i = − sM , then we have
r
(n+1)
i =
1
M
M∑
m=1
q(g(n+1)m )i + (e˜
(n+1))i =
(n+ 1− s)− (n+ 1)a
M
. (104)
First of all, let n = s = 2k − 1, we have r(n+1)i = 1−2kaM . Therefore, if a = 12k , it is possible that
2|r(n+1)i | = 0 ≤ aM .
When a < n+1−sn+1 , 2|r(n+1)i | > aM yields
a <
2(n+ 1− s)
2n+ 3
. (105)
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Let n = (2k + 1) × 2y − 2 and s = 2k × 2y − 1, where y is some non-negative integer, we
have n+1−sn+1 =
2y
(2k+1)×2y−1 . According to (105), a <
2y+1
(2k+1)×2y+1−1 . When y = 0,
n+1−s
n+1 =
2y
(2k+1)×2y−1 =
1
2k . As y (and therefore n and s) increases, a decreases and approaches
1
2k+1 .
When a > n+1−sn+1 , 2|r(n+1)i | > aM yields
a >
2(n+ 1− s)
2n+ 1
. (106)
Let n = (2k+1)×2y and s = 2k×2y +1, where y is some non-negative integer, we have n+1−sn+1 =
2y
(2k+1)×2y+1 . According to (106), a >
2y+1
(2k+1)×2y+1+1 . When y = 0,
n+1−s
n+1 =
2y
(2k+1)×2y+1 =
1
2k+2 . As y (and therefore n and s) increases, a increases and approaches
1
2k+1 .
Remark 11. By assuming that the total number of workers is odd, it is guaranteed that there is
always a winner in the majority vote. When the number of workers is even, it is possible that rti = 0
and therefore (96) does not hold. This issue can be addressed if the server ignores the communication
rounds (e.g., does not transmit anything) during which there is no winner in the majority vote.
5 Details of the Implementation
Our experiments are mainly implemented using Python 3.7.4 with packages tensorflow 2.0 and
numpy 1.16.5. One Intel i7-9700 CPU with 32 GB of memory and one NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2070
SUPER GPU are used in the experiments.
5.1 Dataset and Pre-processing
We perform experiments on the standard MNIST dataset for handwritten digit recognition consisting
of 60,000 training samples and 10,000 testing samples.3 Each sample is a 28×28 size gray-level
image. We normalize the data by dividing it with the max RGB value (i.e., 255.0).
5.2 Dataset Assignment
In our experiments, we consider 31 normal workers and measure the data heterogeneity by the number
of labels of data that each worker stores. We first partition the training dataset according to the labels.
For each worker, we randomly generate a set of size n which indicates the labels of training data that
should be assigned to this worker. Then, a subset of training data from the corresponding labels is
randomly sampled and assigned to the worker without replacement. The size of the subset depends
on n and the size of the training data for each label. More specifically, we set the size of the subset as
b60000/(31n)c in the beginning. When there are not enough training data for a label, we reduce the
size of the subset accordingly. We consider the scenarios that all the workers have the same n. For the
results in the third figure in Fig. 2, we set n = 1, 2, 4 for “1 LABEL”, “2 LABELS”, “4 LABELS”,
respectively. For the rest of the results, we set n = 1.
5.3 Neural Network Setting
We implement a two-layer fully connected neural network with softmax of classes with cross-entropy
loss. The hidden layer has 128 hidden ReLU units.
5.4 Learning Rate Tuning
We use a constant learning rate η and tune the parameters from the set
{1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}. In particular, for Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-SIGNSGD, we set
η = 0.005; for DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, we set η = 0.01. For FedAvg [28], we tune the
learning rate from the set {2, 1.5, 1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}, the number of local epochs
from the set {1, 10, 20, 30} and present the best result.
3Avaiable at http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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5.5 Additional Experimental Results
We report some additional experimental results for Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-SIGNSGD in Fig. 4 and Fig.
5. In particular, when there are no Byzantine attackers, we also compare our proposed algorithms
with FedAvg [28] which is not Byzantine resilient. For FedAvg, we tune the learning rate from the set
{2, 1.5, 1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}, the number of local epochs from the set {1, 10, 20, 30}
and present the best result.
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Figure 4: Experimental results showing the training and testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-
SIGNSGD for Optimal b and different number of Byzantine attackers. The solid curves represent
the mean value and the shaded region spans one standard deviation obtained over five repetitions.
EF-Sto-SIGNSGD outperforms Sto-SIGNSGD, SIGNSGD in all the examined scenarios. In addition, it can be
observed that the proposed algorithms perform better than FedAvg while requires less communication
overhead per round.
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Figure 5: Experimental results showing the training and testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-
SIGNSGD for different b = b · 1. The solid curves represent the mean value and the shaded region
spans one standard deviation obtained over five repetitions. EF-Sto-SIGNSGD outperforms Sto-SIGNSGD,
SIGNSGD and FedAvg when there is no Byzantine attacker.
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We report some additional experimental results for DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD in Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: Experimental results showing the training and testing accuracy of DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-
SIGNSGD for different  when there is no Byzantine attacker. The solid curves represent the mean
value and the shaded region spans one standard deviation obtained over five repetitions. The ’s
measure the per epoch privacy guarantee of the algorithms. EF-DP-SIGNSGD outperforms DP-SIGNSGD
and SIGNSGD.
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